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Abstract 
This paper investigates the impact of state subsidy on the behavior of the entrepreneur under 
asymmetric information. Several authors formulated concerns about state intervention as it 
can aggravate moral hazard in corporate financing. In the seminal paper of Holmström and 
Tirole (1997) a two-player moral hazard model is presented with an entrepreneur initiating a 
risky scalable project and a private investor (e.g. bank or venture capitalist) providing outside 
financing. The novelty of our research is that this basic moral hazard model is extended to the 
case of positive externalities and to three players by introducing the state subsidizing the 
project. It is shown that in the optimum, state subsidy does not harm, but improves the 
incentives of the entrepreneur to make efforts for the success of the project; hence in effect 
state intervention reduces moral hazard. Consequently, state subsidy increases social welfare 
which is defined as the sum of private and public net benefits. Also, the exact form of the 
state subsidy (ex-ante/ex-post, conditional/unconditional, refundable/nonrefundable) is 
irrelevant in respect of the optimal size and the total welfare effect of the project. Moreover, 
in case of nonrefundable subsidies state does not crowd out private investors; but on the 
contrary, by providing additional capital it boosts private financing. In case of refundable 
subsidies some crowding effects may occur depending on the subsidy form and the 
parameters. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In the literature, there have been made serious efforts to understand the effects of state 
subsidy in corporate financing in case of asymmetric information which may have two 
negative consequences: adverse selection and moral hazard. As it is summarized in Kotowitz 
(2008, page 6), the results are mixed: „The existence of such inefficiencies signals a possible 
role for government. However, government intervention may well cause more problems than 
it solves… It is therefore unclear whether government supply of these services enhances 
welfare.” 
 
Takalo and Tanayama (2010), and Kleer (2010) focused on the adverse selection problems in 
the framework of theoretical models, and concluded that state subsidy may help to resolve this 
kind of market failure. On the other hand, Chaney and Thakor (1985) examined the moral 
hazard and demonstrated that loan guarantees provided by the state create perverse incentives 
for the firms. Keuschnigg and Nielsen (2001) concluded that in the venture capital industry 
direct subsidies distort incentives, hence do not improve social welfare at all; while soft tools 
like improving training, information and infrastructure may be effective. Schertler (2000, 
2002a, 2002b), and Hirsch (2006) also investigated the role of state subsidy in the financing 
of innovative, early stage enterprises with double-sided moral hazard, where both 
entrepreneurs and private investors (venture capitalists) had to make efforts to contribute to 
the success of the project. According to their results, state subsidy compromises the 
incentives, hence aggravates moral hazard.  
 
There is also a large empirical literature dealing with the effectiveness of state subsidy 
systems. Different countries’ data have been analyzed, see Table 7 in Annex 2. Although data 
and methods are different, there is more or less consensus that state subsidy creates value at 
social level which is mostly due to the positive externalities of the projects and to the role of 
state subsidy in lifting capital constraints.  Meanwhile, the low efficiency of certain projects is 
supposed to be caused by adverse selection and moral hazard, especially in case of large 
firms. Also, different authors disagree on the optimal form and on the crowding out effect of 
the state subsidy.  
 
Contrary to this, in our three-player moral hazard model where the project has positive 
externalities, it is shown that in the optimum, state subsidy effectively reduces moral hazard, 
hence its overall effect is always positive; moreover, the form of subsidy is irrelevant. We 
define six different state subsidy forms within a simple one-period and two-outcome project, 
and we conclude that although the inner structures of the optimal contracts are different, the 
optimal size of the state subsidy and the induced total social welfare are the same for each 
subsidy form. Moreover, we also show that pure grants have no crowding out effect, while in 
case of subsidized loans the crowding out effect depends on the subsidy form and the 
parameters. 
 
Our model is a generalization of the previous moral hazard investigations in corporate 
financing which focused on private parties contracting without state intervention. This topic 
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has been emerging from the seminal papers of Shavell (1979), Sappington (1983), Grossman 
and Hart (1983), Laffont and Tirole (1988), Holmström and Tirole (1997), Hart and Moore 
(1998), and Tirole (2006). The basic model we build on is Holmström and Tirole (1997) as 
the explicit formalization of the variable size investment problem was first presented there. 
 
In Section 2 we summarize the basic moral hazard model with two players (entrepreneur and 
investor) in order to give a better foundation for our model discussed in Section 3 where we 
introduce state as a new player representing the social interests. First, we set out potential 
state subsidy forms; then present our three-player model (entrepreneur, investor and state) and 
derive the optimum for each subsidy form. In Section 4 we evaluate our findings by 
comparing the results of different settings, and finally we derive conclusions in Section 5. 
 
 
2. The two-player model  
 
As in Holmström and Tirole (1997) the entrepreneur owns a scalable project with constant 
rate of return. The initial investment is 𝐼 > 0, and the entrepreneur has an initial asset 
𝐼 > 𝐴 > 0. The missing financing, 𝐼– 𝐴 should be acquired from an outside private investor. 
On the top of this basic model we introduce the positive externalities of the project as a new 
element. 
 
Assumption 1 (Unconditional positive externalities) The project has positive externalities 
which are independent of the success of the project (for example increased employment, 
economic activity of the suppliers, knowledge transfer), can be expressed in nominal value, 
and are proportional to the investment’s size (𝐸𝐼, where 𝐸 > 0). We assume that these 
externalities are directly realized by the state in the form of explicit incomes or savings in the 
state budget at the end of the project. Of course, private contracting parties (entrepreneur, 
investor) do not take these external effects into consideration on their own. 
 
The project is one period long (between t=0 and t=1) and has two outcomes: success with 
probability 𝑝 or failure with probability 1 − 𝑝. Besides the externalities, in case of success the 
project pays a return proportional to the investment’s size (𝑅𝐼, where 𝑅 > 1), while in failure 
the project pays no return, as it can be seen on Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1: Project cash-flows 
 
Source: Tirole (2006) with modification 
 
I 
RI+EI 
EI 
p 
1-p 
0. 1. 
  
4 
 
The probability of the success (p) depends on the entrepreneur’s behavior which is not 
directly observable by the investor. In case of high efforts (behaving) the probability is 
𝑝 = 𝑝𝐻 ,  while in case of low efforts (misbehaving)   𝑝 = 𝑝𝐿  where 𝑝𝐻 > 𝑝𝐿 . Moreover, the 
entrepreneur realizes private benefit (𝐵𝐼 > 0) by misbehaving for example in forms of 
increased utility of shirking, perks and other hidden personal gains which are unavailable for 
the investor. 
 
Hence, we face a typical principal-agent problem where the principal is the investor and the 
agent is the entrepreneur; and the investor has naturally less information on the efforts of 
entrepreneur than the entrepreneur himself which raises the issue of moral hazard. 
 
For the sake of simplicity and without loss of generality time preferences are excluded and 
investors are supposed to be perfectly competitive. 
 
Assumption 2 (Risk neutrality) Both players are risk neutral, hence they are interested only in 
expected values. 
 
It follows from our assumptions that the expected return of the investors is supposed to be 
zero. 
 
Assumption 3 (Relevance of moral hazard) The net present value (NPV) of the project 
(without the externalities) is positive only in the case of high efforts: 
 
𝑁𝑃𝑉𝑏𝑒ℎ𝑎𝑣𝑒 > 0 > 𝑁𝑃𝑉𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑏𝑒ℎ𝑎𝑣𝑒  
 
 𝑝𝐻 𝑅𝐼 − 𝐼 > 0 > 𝑝𝐿𝑅𝐼 − 𝐼 + 𝐵𝐼 
 
 
 𝑝𝐻𝑅 > 1 > 𝑝𝐿𝑅 + 𝐵 (1) 
 
Due to requirement (1) moral hazard does matter, as financing is possible only if the 
entrepreneur behaves. If both 𝑁𝑃𝑉𝑏𝑒ℎ𝑎𝑣𝑒 and 𝑁𝑃𝑉𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑏𝑒ℎ𝑎𝑣𝑒  were positive, there would be no 
financing constraint at all, and the optimal size of the project would be infinite. On the other 
hand if both NPVs were negative there would be no point in investing and financing for the 
private parties at all. 
 
As it can be seen on Figure 1, the success of the project depends also on the environment 
(chance), as the project is possible to succeed in case of low efforts, as well. It should be also 
noticed that the investor is considered to be passive given that the probability of success is 
independent of his behavior once the financing is provided.4 
 
                                                 
4
 In case of venture capital investments the investor is actively working on the project, hence we face a double 
moral hazard problem, see (Schertler 2000, 2002a, 2002b) and (Hirsch 2006). 
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Assumption 4 (Liability) The entrepreneur has limited liability, while the investor has 
unlimited liability. Hence, the entrepreneur‘s future return must be nonnegative in any cases, 
but the investor’s future return can be of any sign. 5 
 
Contract design has to answer two questions: 
- What is the optimal size of the project (𝐼)? 
- How much the entrepreneur and the investor gets in case of success, (𝑅𝑒) and (𝑅𝑖); 
and in case of failure, (𝑟𝑒) and (𝑟𝑖)? 
 
We note that there are only two outcomes of the project, therefore we cannot differentiate 
between convex (equity) and concave (debt) repayment forms. Hence, the outside investor 
can be considered as a shareholder or as a lender, it is not specified in the model. 
 
The entrepreneur maximizes his welfare by offering a contract to the investor who can accept 
or refuse it. In a classical principal-agent model it is usually the principal who offers the 
contract to the agent. However, in Holmström and Tirole (1997) it is the agent (the 
entrepreneur) who takes the initiative. This may seem strange for the first sight. The reason 
behind this setting is that investors are operating on a perfectly competitive market and it is 
the entrepreneur who has a particular project of positive NPV; hence the value is created on 
his side. This is why he has the bargaining power to offer the contract. The timing of the 
project is presented on Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2: The timing of the two-player project 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Tirole (2006) 
 
When designing the contract, the entrepreneur maximizes his welfare (his net expected 
benefit): 
 
 max 𝑝𝐻𝑅𝐼 − 𝑝𝐻 𝑅𝑖 − (1 − 𝑝𝐻 )𝑟𝑖 − 𝐴 (2) 
 
with respect to some constraints. First of all, the contract must ensure that the entrepreneur 
has interest to behave, otherwise NPV would be negative, and the investor would refuse to 
finance it. This requirement can be expressed as 
 
 𝑝𝐻 𝑅𝑒 + (1 − 𝑝𝐻 )𝑟𝑒 ≥ 𝑝𝐿 𝑅𝑒 + (1 − 𝑝𝐿 )𝑟𝑒 + 𝐵𝐼  
 
                                                 
5
 Investors are supposed to hold a large divers ified portfolio and this project is just one element of it. Hence, with 
regard to this special project they can be supposed to have unlimited liability. 
investor 
accepts 
or not 
entrepreneur 
behaves or 
not 
project 
succeeds 
or not 
sharing of 
the return 
entrepreneur 
offers 
a contract 
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meaning that behaving should be more attractive than misbehaving for the entrepreneur. 
Applying the notation of 𝑝𝐻 − 𝑝𝐿 = ∆𝑝, the incentive constraint of the entrepreneur (ICe) can 
be simplified to 
 
ICe 𝑅𝑒 − 𝑟𝑒 ≥
𝐵𝐼
∆𝑝
 
(3) 
 
Secondly, also the investor should have interest to participate (PC - participation constraint) 
by getting back at least his investment (F): 
 
PCi 𝑝𝐻𝑅𝑖 + (1 − 𝑝𝐻 )𝑟𝑖 ≥ 𝐹  (4) 
 
Other constraints come from the budget constraints (BC) at 𝑡 = 0 and 𝑡 = 1 as it is not 
possible to spend more what is disposable. The optimization problem of the entrepreneur is 
summarized in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: The optimization program of the entrepreneur 
obj. objective function  max 𝑝𝐻 𝑅𝐼 − 𝑝𝐻 𝑅𝑖 − (1 − 𝑝𝐻 )𝑟𝑖 − 𝐴 
ICe incentive constraint of the 
entrepreneur 
𝑅𝑒 − 𝑟𝑒 −
𝐵𝐼
∆𝑝
≥ 0 
PCi participation constraint of the 
investor 
𝑝𝐻 𝑅𝑖 + (1 − 𝑝𝐻 )𝑟𝑖 − 𝐹 ≥ 0 
BC0 budget constraint at t=0 𝐴 + 𝐹 − 𝐼 ≥ 0 
BC1 
(up) 
budget constraint at t=1 in case of 
success 
𝑅𝐼 − 𝑅𝑒 − 𝑅𝑖 ≥ 0 
BC1 
(down) 
budget constraint at t=1 in case of 
failure 
0 − 𝑟𝑒 − 𝑟𝑖 ≥ 0 
 Source: authors, based on Holmström and Tirole (1997) 
 
Parameters like 𝑅, 𝐴,  𝑝𝐻 , 𝑝𝐿 ,𝐵 are given exogenously and there is no uncertainty about their 
values. While parameters like 𝐹, 𝐼,  𝑅𝑒 , 𝑅𝑖 ,  𝑟𝑒 , 𝑟𝑖 are decision variables to be determined in 
the contract as a result of the optimization program in Table 1. 
 
Assumption 5 (No reward in failure) In case of failure the entrepreneur receives no reward. 
It is a natural idea that the entrepreneur is not rewarded in case of failure as he is the only one 
responsible for the success of the project. 
 
Combining Assumption 4 and Assumption 5, we get that in case of failure, the return of the 
entrepreneur, 𝑟𝑒, cannot be either negative (limited liability of the entrepreneur) or positive 
(no reward in failure), thus it should be zero (𝑟𝑒 = 0). 
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Proposition 1 (Optimum without state subsidy) There exists only one solution to the problem 
in Table 1. In this optimum 
 
- the size of the investment is 
 
 
𝐼 =
1
1 − 𝑝𝐻 (𝑅 −
𝐵
∆𝑝)
𝐴 =
1
1 − 𝜌0
A 
(5) 
 
where 𝜌0  is the so called pledgeable income (the maximum amount the entrepreneur 
can promise to the investor without the risk of moral hazard in case of a one-dollar 
investment), see Tirole (2006).  
It follows from Assumption 3 that the pledgeable income is always positive. Given 
that the size of the investment (𝐼) and the initial liquid asset (𝐴) are supposed to be 
positive, we also know that in the optimum the pledgeable income is less than one: 
0 < 𝜌0 < 1. 
 
- the private financing is 
 
 𝐹 =
𝜌0
1 − 𝜌0
𝐴 (6) 
 
- the share of the investor in case of success is 
 
 𝑅𝑖 =
𝜌0
𝑝𝐻 (1 − 𝜌0 )
𝐴 
 
(7) 
- the share of the investor in case of failure is 
 
 𝑟𝑖 = 0 
 
(8) 
- the share of the entrepreneur is in case of success is 
 
 
𝑅𝑒 =
𝑝𝐻 𝑅 − 𝜌0
𝑝𝐻 (1 − 𝜌0 )
𝐴 
(9) 
   
Proof The multivariate optimization problem can be solved by applying the Kuhn-Tucker 
method. The corresponding Lagrange function is 
 
ℒ = 𝑝𝐻 𝑅𝐼 − 𝑝𝐻 𝑅𝑖 − (1 − 𝑝𝐻)𝑟𝑖 − 𝐴 − 𝜆1 (
𝐵𝐼
∆𝑝
− 𝑅𝑒 − 𝑟𝑒) − 𝜆2(𝐹 − 𝑝𝐻 𝑅𝑖 − (1 − 𝑝𝐻 )𝑟𝑖)
− 𝜆3(𝐼 − 𝐴 − 𝐹) − 𝜆4(𝑅𝑒 + 𝑅𝑖 − 𝑅𝐼) − 𝜆5(𝑟𝑒 + 𝑟𝑖) 
 
Considering the necessary and sufficient conditions of the optimum, it can be easily seen that 
all lambdas are positive; hence all the five constraints are fulfilled with equality. Applying 
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Assumption 5 (𝑟𝑒 = 0) we have five variables (𝐼,𝐹, 𝑅𝑒 , 𝑅𝑖 , 𝑟𝑖) and five independent equations, 
hence the solution is unique and Equations (6-9) can be derived by simple algebra. □ 
 
The main conclusions of the two-player model can be summarized as follows: 
- We can see from Equation (5) that the size of the investment (𝐼) is limited by the 
initial asset of the entrepreneur (𝐴). The entrepreneur would be interested to increase 
the project size to infinity (his net benefit would go to infinity too); but at a certain 
level of initial asset, moral hazard puts restraint to the outside financing, hence to the 
project size, as well. Accordingly, the model provides an equilibrium explanation of 
credit rationing (i.e. why financial markets do not always clear by price adjustment), 
Tirole (2006). 
- Loan is accredited only if good behavior of the entrepreneur is assured. Hence the 
problem of moral hazard is fully solved by the incentives set up in the contract at the 
beginning of the project. No further tools, like costly monitoring, are needed. 
- The entrepreneur receives the entire surplus of the project (𝑁𝑃𝑉 = 𝑝𝐻 𝑅𝐼 − 𝐼); this 
keeps him motivated to behave. 
- The project has positive external effects on the state budget (𝐸𝐼); but as the size of the 
investment is constrained, external effects are also constrained by the agency problem. 
- The initial asset of the entrepreneur has shadow value in the sense that one additional 
dollar invested in the project would create additional NPV (and positive externalities). 
It follows from this that the entrepreneur has interest to invest all his capital into the 
project. 
 
It is also shown that even if we remove Assumption 5 (No reward in failure), any reward to 
the entrepreneur in failure would be suboptimal (Tirole 2006, page 116.). By all means, it is 
obviously not a good idea to compensate the entrepreneur for the failure as it would destroy 
his incentives to behave. 
 
In the next part we examine what happens if state intervenes in favor of social welfare. 
 
 
3. The three-player model 
 
In order to analyze the impact of state subsidy on the project financing under moral hazard we 
introduce state as the third player while keeping most of the model’s assumptions unchanged.6 
 
We assume that in the first round the state offers a contract to the entrepreneur. This contract 
defines the size (𝑆 > 0) and other conditions of the subsidy. The entrepreneur may decide to 
take it or leave it. If the subsidy contract is accepted by the entrepreneur, then, in the second 
round, based on the available state subsidy the entrepreneur offers a contract to the private 
investor exactly as in Holmström and Tirole (1997) where the invested private capital 
                                                 
6
 Csóka et al. (2015) also developed the same basic model by introducing a new player: the buyer of the 
entrepreneur. 
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provided by investor (𝐹), the size of the project (𝐼), the return to the entrepreneur in success 
and in failure (𝑅𝑒 ,  𝑟𝑒), and the return to the investor in success and in failure (𝑅𝑖 ,  𝑟𝑖) are 
settled down. The timing of the three-player project is illustrated on Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3: Timing of the three-player model 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: the authors 
 
As one can see on Figure 3, the new elements compared to Figure 2 are only due to the 
presence of the state which intervenes at the beginning of the project, all the rest remains the 
same as in Holmström and Tirole (1997). 
 
We note that in principle it is also possible that state gives the subsidy to the private investor 
in order to encourage private lending. It can be shown that this would not influence the 
outcome of the model, mainly because when formulating the subsidy contract state considers 
the interests of all players.7 
 
3.1 Forms of state subsidy 
 
In the framework of the above described, simple, one-period and two-outcome project, 
logically there exist six different forms of state subsidies. If a state subsidy is non-refundable, 
theoretically it can be received either at the beginning or at the end of the project. In the latter 
case it can be awarded either in success or in failure.8 We get three possibilities: 
1. nonrefundable ex-ante subsidy 
2. nonrefundable ex-post subsidy received in case of success 
3. nonrefundable ex-post subsidy received in case of failure (e.g. guarantee) 
 
If a state subsidy is refundable, it can be required to be refunded in any case (unconditional) 
or only in case of success or in case of failure (conditional): 
4. refundable ex-ante subsidy 
5. refundable ex-ante subsidy repaid in case of failure 
6. refundable ex-ante subsidy repaid in case of success 
 
All these six subsidy forms exist in the real world international practice, and logically they 
cover all the possibilities corresponding to a project of the general scheme of Figure 4. 
 
                                                 
7
 Berlinger et al. (2015) present a model where the players (state, entrepreneur and private investor) make a 
three-sided contract in one round. 
8
 If it is given out at the end irrespectively whether the project succeeds or fails, it can be considered as the 
combination of the two (forms 2 and 3). 
investor 
accepts 
or not 
entrepreneur 
behaves or 
not 
project 
succeeds 
or not 
sharing of 
the return 
entrepreneur 
offers 
a contract to 
private investor 
state offers 
a contract to 
entrepreneur 
entrepreneur 
accepts 
or not 
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Figure 4: The structure of the state subsidy 
  
Source: the authors 
 
Definition 1 (Net present value of state subsidy) In each form of state subsidies the net 
present value of the subsidy (𝑆)̅ is calculated as the sum of the expected value of all cash-
flows at t=0: 
 
 𝑆̅ = 𝑆0 + 𝑝𝑆1
𝑢𝑝 + (1 − 𝑝)𝑆1
𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛 (10) 
 
Table 2 summarizes state subsidies of different dimensions. Cash-flows are presented from 
the entrepreneur’s perspective (𝑆 is an inflow for the entrepreneur but an outflow for the 
state). 
 
Table 2: State subsidy forms and their cash-flows from the entrepreneur's perspective 
 
Unconditional 
Conditional 
Reward in success Rescue in failure 
Non 
refundable 
1. Nonrefundable  
ex-ante subsidy 
 
 
𝑆̅ = 𝑆 
2. Ex-post subsidy  
in case of success 
 
 
𝑆̅ = 𝑝𝑆 
3. Ex-post subsidy  
in case of failure 
 
 
𝑆̅ = (1 − 𝑝)𝑆 
Refundable 
4. Refundable  
ex-ante subsidy 
 
 
𝑆̅ = 0 
5. Ex-ante subsidy 
refundable in failure 
 
 
𝑆̅ = 𝑝𝑆 
6. Ex-ante subsidy 
refundable in success 
 
 
𝑆̅ = (1 − 𝑝)𝑆 
Source: the authors 
 
Four subsidies are received ex-ante (1, 4, 5, 6), and two of the subsidies are received ex-post 
(2, 3). Two of them are unconditional (1, 4), whilst four are conditional on the success of the 
project (2, 3, 5, 6). Two of the conditional subsidies can be considered as a reward for success 
(2, 5), while two of them are rather a rescue in failure (3, 6). Only one subsidy form (4) does 
𝑆0 
S 0 0 
S S S 
𝑆1
𝑢𝑝 
0 S 0 
-S 0 -S 
𝑆1
𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛  
0 0 S 
-S -S 0 
p 
1-p 
0. 1. 
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not have positive present value.9 In the next part of the paper we examine these subsidies in 
more details. 
 
3.2 Non-refundable ex-ante subsidy 
 
The simplest state subsidy form is the non-refundable ex-ante subsidy. In this section we 
present the two-stage, three-player optimization process for this subsidy form. 
 
Assumption 6 (State’s objective) The objective of the state is to maximize the total social 
utility (U), also called as social welfare. It is defined as the sum of the private benefits and the 
public benefits minus the costs of the total investment. 
 
𝑈 = 𝑝𝑅𝐼 + 𝐸𝐼 − 𝐼 = (𝑝𝑅𝐼 − 𝑝𝑅𝑖 − (1 − 𝑝)𝑟𝑖 − 𝐴) + (𝐸𝐼 − 𝑆̅)
= 𝑁𝑃𝑉𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒 + 𝑁𝑃𝑉𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐 = 𝑈𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒 + 𝑈𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐  
(11) 
 
We keep all the assumptions of the two-player model unchanged (unconditional positive 
externalities, relevance of moral hazard, risk neutrality of private players, limited liability of 
the entrepreneur, unlimited liability of the investor, no reward for the entrepreneur in failure). 
However, we slightly modify the assumption about the relevance of moral hazard in order to 
take externalities into account. 
 
Assumption 7 (Relevance of moral hazard also at social level) Moral hazard is a relevant 
issue at private and social level, as well. Hence, in addition to Assumption 3 we require that 
moral hazard make difference from the perspective of social utility too: 
 
𝑈𝑏𝑒ℎ𝑎𝑣𝑒 > 0 > 𝑈𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑏𝑒ℎ𝑎𝑣𝑒  
 
 𝑝𝐻 𝑅𝐼 + 𝐸𝐼 − 𝐼 > 0 > 𝑝𝐿𝑅𝐼 + 𝐸𝐼 + 𝐵𝐼 − 𝐼 
 
 
 𝑝𝐻 𝑅 + 𝐸 > 1 > 𝑝𝐿𝑅 + 𝐸 + 𝐵 (12) 
 
Combining Inequalities (1) and (12) we get the domain which is relevant for our 
investigation: 
 𝑝𝐻 𝑅 > 1 > 𝑝𝐿𝑅 + 𝐸 + 𝐵 (13) 
 
Given that 𝑝𝐿  and 𝑅 are positive, it follows that 1 − 𝐸 − 𝐵  is also positive, therefore 𝐸 must 
be less than one: 1 − 𝐵 >  𝐸 >  0. 
 
When requiring Inequality (13) we exclude two mixed cases: 
                                                 
9
 A comprehensive summary of state subsidies  can be found in Walter (2014). 
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1. Moral hazard is relevant at private level, but is not relevant at social level: It can 
happen when positive externalities are so high that at social level it is worth to 
finance the project even if the entrepreneur misbehaves. In this case the optimal 
state subsidy policy would be to provide infinite subsidy. 
2. Moral hazard is not relevant at private level, but is relevant at social level: It can 
happen when the project in itself has a negative NPV even if the entrepreneur 
behaves, and only externalities would make the project attractive at social level. 
While this project would be worth for the state to subsidize, the subsidized case 
could not be reasonably compared to the above discussed base case where private 
parties finance the project on their own. 
 
In the three-player model there are two consecutive contracts, the first between the state and 
the entrepreneur, the second is between the entrepreneur and the private investor. In both 
relations the entrepreneur is the agent, while the state and the private investor are the 
principals. 
 
Assumption 8 (Information of the state) Once the subsidy contract is settled down, the state 
(similarly to the private investor) cannot directly observe the behavior of the entrepreneur. In 
this sense state has less information than the entrepreneur (asymmetric information). 
However, state is fully aware of the reaction functions of the private players reflecting the 
choices of the private parties (the entrepreneur and the investor), hence all the exogenous 
parameters of the project and the participation constraint of the private investor are known by 
the state (and also by the private parties) without uncertainty. 
 
Lemma 1: (Reaction functions of the entrepreneur) The present value of the state subsidy (𝑆̅) 
serves as additional asset for the entrepreneur which complements his initial assets (𝐴). The 
reaction functions of the entrepreneur can be expressed in terms of the state subsidy (new 
elements in the formulae relative to the base case in Proposition 1 are signaled by bold blue 
letters): 
 
- the size of the investment is 
 
 
𝐼 =
1
1 − 𝜌0
(𝐴 + ?̅?) 
(14) 
- the private financing is 
 
 𝐹 = 𝐼 − 𝐴 − 𝑆 =
𝜌0
1 − 𝜌0
(𝐴 + ?̅?) (15) 
 
- the share of the investor in case of success is 
 
 𝑅𝑖 =
𝜌0
𝑝𝐻 (1 − 𝜌0)
(𝐴 + ?̅?) 
 
 
(16) 
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- the share of the investor in case of failure is 
 
 𝑟𝑖 = 0 
 
(17) 
- the share of the entrepreneur in case of success is 
 
 
𝑅𝑒 =
𝑝𝐻 𝑅 − 𝜌0
𝑝𝐻 (1 − 𝜌0)
(𝐴 + ?̅?) 
(18) 
   
Proof The optimization problem to be solved by the entrepreneur is summarized in Table 3. 
The only difference compared to the base case presented in Table 1 is that the budget 
constraint in 𝑡 = 0 is changed because also the state subsidy is involved in the project 
financing. 
 
Table 3: The optimization program of the entrepreneur 
in case of nonrefundable ex-ante state subsidy 
obj. objective function max 𝑝𝐻 𝑅𝐼 − 𝑝𝐻 𝑅𝑖 − (1 − 𝑝𝐻 )𝑟𝑖 − 𝐴 
ICe incentive constraint of the 
entrepreneur 
𝑅𝑒 − 𝑟𝑒 −
𝐵𝐼
∆𝑝
≥ 0 
PCi participation constraint of the 
investor 
𝑝𝐻 𝑅𝑖 + (1 − 𝑝𝐻)𝑟𝑖 − 𝐹 ≥ 0 
BC0 budget constraint at 𝑡 = 0 𝐴 + 𝐹 + 𝑺 − 𝐼 ≥ 0 
BC1s budget constraint at 𝑡 = 1 in success 𝑅𝐼 − 𝑅𝑒 − 𝑅𝑖 ≥ 0 
BC1f budget constraint at 𝑡 = 1 in failure 0 − 𝑟𝑒 − 𝑟𝑖 ≥ 0 
Source: the authors 
 
The optimization program can be solved again using the corresponding Lagrange function. 
Similarly to the base case, all the constraints are binding. Applying Assumption 5 (No reward 
in failure) and the definitions of the pledgeable income (𝜌0) and of the present value of state 
subsidy (𝑆̅) Equations (14-18) can be derived. □ 
 
Proposition 2 (Entrepreneur accepts state subsidy) The entrepreneur will accept any of the 
subsidies presented in Table 2. 
 
Proof The entrepreneur is supposed to be rational in the sense that he is maximizing his 
expected net benefit. According to Assumption 5 (No reward in failure), his total 
investment’s cash flow has only two elements: the investment of his initial asset (A) at the 
beginning and his return (𝑅𝑒) in case of success at 𝑡 = 1. Given that A is fixed (it is the 
maximum amount of asset he can invest at 𝑡 = 0), his only way to increase his net benefit is 
to increase his return in success which according to Equation (18) is the increasing function of 
the present value of state subsidy (𝑆̅). As the present value of the state subsidy is always 
nonnegative (𝑆̅ ≥ 0), the entrepreneur will accept it.□ 
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Assumption 9 (State’s participation constraint) State has a participation constraint (PCS), as 
it cannot give out more subsidies than it is expected to return in form of quantifiable 
externalities appearing explicitly in the budget. In other words, the overall public utility of the 
subsidy cannot be negative between t=0 and t=1: 
 
PCS 𝑈𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐 = 𝑁𝑃𝑉𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐 = 𝐸𝐼 − 𝑆̅ ≥ 0 (19) 
 
It follows from Assumption 9 that the expected rate of return of the state is zero if both 
subsidies and externalities are also taken into account. 
 
Proposition 3 (Optimum for nonrefundable ex-ante subsidy) There exists an optimal contract 
for a nonrefundable ex-ante subsidy: 
 
- the size of the state subsidy is 
 
 
𝑺 = ?̅? =
𝑬
𝟏 − 𝝆𝟎 − 𝑬
𝑨 
 
(20) 
- the size of the investment is 
 
 
𝐼 =
1
1 − 𝜌0 − 𝑬
𝐴 
 
(21) 
- the social utility is 
 
 
𝑈 =
𝑝𝐻 𝑅 + 𝐸 − 1
1 − 𝜌0 − 𝑬
𝐴 
(22) 
 
Proof The aim of the state is to maximize the social utility (𝑈) which is the sum of private 
and public benefits minus the total investment: 
 
 𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝑝𝐻 𝑅𝐼 + 𝐸𝐼 − 𝐼 (23) 
 
Substituting Equation (14) into (23) we get the objective function of the state with respect to 
the size of the state subsidy (in this special case 𝑆 = 𝑆)̅ 
 
 
𝑚𝑎𝑥 (𝑝𝐻𝑅 + 𝐸 − 1)
𝐴 + 𝑆
1 − 𝜌0
 
(24) 
 
The state’s participation constraint formulated in Assumption 9 has also to be fulfilled. 
Substituting Equation (14) into Inequality (19) we arrive at 
 
PCS 𝐴 + 𝑆
1 − 𝜌0
𝐸 − 𝑆 ≥ 0 
(25) 
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Table 4 presents the states’ optimization program in case of a nonrefundable ex-ante state 
subsidy. 
 
Table 4: The optimization program of the state 
in case of a nonrefundable ex-ante state subsidy 
obj. objective function  
𝑚𝑎𝑥 (𝑝𝐻 𝑅 + 𝐸 − 1)
𝐴 + 𝑆
1 − 𝜌0
 
PCS participation constraint of the state E ∙
𝐴 + 𝑆
1 − 𝜌0
− 𝑆 ≥ 0 
Source: the authors 
 
The optimization program can be solved by the Lagrange method, as usual. The constraint 
binds, in optimum p=pH, and we get Equations (20-22). □ 
 
3.3 Other forms of state subsidy 
 
Other forms of state subsidy can also be examined in a similar way. Table 5 presents all the 
optimization programs in details, while Annex 2 summarizes the results. 
 
Proposition 4 (Unconditional refundable subsidy has no effect) In case of subsidy form 4 (ex-
ante subsidy refundable in any case) the subsidy does not influence the optimal project size 
and the social utility relative to the base case. If state intervenes in this form, it just crowds 
out private financing without any growth effect. 
 
Proof When solving the corresponding optimization problem set out in Table 5 we get that the 
optimal project size is independent of the amount of the state subsidy and is equal to the 
project size in the case of two private players as in Equation (5): 
 
 
𝐼 =
𝐴
1 − 𝑝𝐻 (𝑅 −
𝐵
∆𝑝)
=
1
1 − 𝜌0
𝐴 
(26) 
 
Moreover, there are no separate formulae for the optimal size of the state subsidy (𝑆) and the 
private financing (𝐹), as they are prefect substitutes: 
 
 𝐹 + 𝑆 = 𝐼 − 𝐴 =
𝜌0
1 − 𝜌0
𝐴 (27) 
□ 
If the interest rate of the loan to be refunded is lower than the market rate, the interest rate 
subsidy can be expressed in its present value, and its effect is the same as that of a 
nonrefundable subsidy of a similar amount analyzed in section 3.2. As in the case of 
unconditionally refundable state subsidy the present value of the subsidy is zero, it does not 
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increase the initial asset of the entrepreneur in any sense; therefore it has no effect on the 
project size either. 
 
Definition 2 (Real state subsidies) In case of subsidy forms 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6 the net present 
value of the subsidy (𝑆̅) is positive. Hence these schemes will be referred as real state 
subsidies, whereas form 4 will be excluded from the further investigations. 
 
Proposition 5 (Neutrality of subsidy forms) In the optimums the net present value of the state 
subsidy (𝑆̅), the size of the investment (I), and the social utility (U) are the same for each real 
subsidy form. Hence the form of the state subsidy is irrelevant from macroeconomic 
perspective. 
 
Proof Optimization programs in Table 5 can be solved by the Lagrange method. In case of all 
real subsidy forms constraints bind and a unique optimum can be easily derived as shown in 
Annex 2. □ 
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Table 5: Optimization programs for different forms of state subsidies 
 1. Non-refundable ex-ante subsidy 2. Ex-post subsidy in success 3. Ex-post subsidy in failure 
Step 1 max 𝑝𝐻 𝑅𝐼 − 𝑝𝐻 𝑅𝑖 − (1 − 𝑝𝐻 )𝑟𝑖 − 𝐴 max 𝑝𝐻 (𝑅𝐼 + 𝑆) − 𝑝𝐻 𝑅𝑖 − (1 − 𝑝𝐻 )𝑟𝑖 − 𝐴 max 𝑝𝐻 𝑅𝐼 + (1 − 𝑝𝐻 )𝑆 − 𝑝𝐻𝑅𝑖 − (1 − 𝑝𝐻 )𝑟𝑖 − 𝐴 
ICe 𝑅𝑒 − 𝑟𝑒 −
𝐵𝐼
∆𝑝
≥ 0 𝑅𝑒 − 𝑟𝑒 −
𝐵𝐼
∆𝑝
≥ 0 𝑅𝑒 − 𝑟𝑒 −
𝐵𝐼
∆𝑝
≥ 0 
PCi 𝑝𝐻 𝑅𝑖 + (1 − 𝑝𝐻 )𝑟𝑖 − 𝐹 ≥ 0 𝑝𝐻 𝑅𝑖 + (1 − 𝑝𝐻 )𝑟𝑖 − 𝐹 ≥ 0 𝑝𝐻𝑅𝑖 + (1 − 𝑝𝐻 )𝑟𝑖 − 𝐹 ≥ 0 
BC0 𝐴 + 𝐹 + 𝑆 − 𝐼 ≥ 0 𝐴 + 𝐹 − 𝐼 ≥ 0 𝐴 + 𝐹 − 𝐼 ≥ 0 
BC1
u 𝑅𝐼 − 𝑅𝑒 − 𝑅𝑖 ≥ 0 𝑅𝐼 + 𝑆 − 𝑅𝑒 − 𝑅𝑖 ≥ 0 𝑅𝐼 − 𝑅𝑒 − 𝑅𝑖 ≥ 0 
BC1
d 0 − 𝑟𝑒 − 𝑟𝑖 ≥ 0 0 − 𝑟𝑒 − 𝑟𝑖 ≥ 0 𝑆 − 𝑟𝑒 − 𝑟𝑖 ≥ 0 
Step 2 max 𝑝𝐻 𝑅𝐼 + 𝐸𝐼 − 𝐼 max 𝑝𝐻 𝑅𝐼 + 𝐸𝐼 − 𝐼 − 𝑝𝐻 𝑆 max 𝑝𝐻 𝑅𝐼 + 𝐸𝐼 − 𝐼 − (1 − 𝑝𝐻 )𝑆 
obj. max (𝑝𝐻𝑅 + 𝐸 − 1)
𝐴 + 𝑆
1 − 𝜌0
 max  (𝑝𝐻𝑅 + 𝐸 − 1)
𝐴 + 𝑝𝐻 𝑆
1 − 𝜌0
− 𝑝𝐻 𝑆 max  (𝑝𝐻𝑅 + 𝐸 − 1)
𝐴 + (1 − 𝑝𝐻)𝑆
1 − 𝜌0
− (1 − 𝑝𝐻 )𝑆 
PCS 
𝐸𝐼 − 𝑆 ≥ 0 𝐸𝐼 − 𝑝𝐻𝑆 ≥ 0 𝐸𝐼 − (1 − 𝑝𝐻 )𝑆 ≥ 0 
𝐸
𝐴 + 𝑆
1 − 𝜌0
− 𝑆 ≥ 0 𝐸
𝐴 + 𝑝𝐻 𝑆
1 − 𝜌0
− 𝑝𝐻 𝑆 ≥ 0 𝐸
𝐴 + (1 − 𝑝𝐻 )𝑆
1 − 𝜌0
− (1 − 𝑝𝐻 )𝑆 ≥ 0 
 4. Refundable ex-ante subsidy 5. Ex-ante subsidy refundable in failure 6. Ex-ante subsidy refundable in success 
Step 1 max 𝑝𝐻 𝑅𝐼 − 𝑝𝐻 𝑅𝑖 − (1 − 𝑝𝐻 )𝑟𝑖 − 𝐴 max 𝑝𝐻 𝑅𝐼 − (1 − 𝑝𝐻 )𝑆 − 𝑝𝐻 𝑅𝑖 − (1 − 𝑝𝐻 )𝑟𝑖 − 𝐴 max 𝑝𝐻𝑅𝐼 − 𝑝𝐻 𝑅𝑖 − (1 − 𝑝𝐻 )𝑟𝑖 − 𝑝𝐻 𝑆 − 𝐴 
ICe 𝑅𝑒 − 𝑟𝑒 −
𝐵𝐼
∆𝑝
≥ 0 𝑅𝑒 − 𝑟𝑒 −
𝐵𝐼
∆𝑝
≥ 0 𝑅𝑒 − 𝑟𝑒 −
𝐵𝐼
∆𝑝
≥ 0 
PCi 𝑝𝐻 𝑅𝑖 + (1 − 𝑝𝐻 )𝑟𝑖 − 𝐹 ≥ 0 𝑝𝐻 𝑅𝑖 + (1 − 𝑝𝐻 )𝑟𝑖 − 𝐹 ≥ 0 𝑝𝐻𝑅𝑖 + (1 − 𝑝𝐻 )𝑟𝑖 − 𝐹 ≥ 0 
BC0 𝐴 + 𝐹 + 𝑆 − 𝐼 ≥ 0 𝐴 + 𝐹 + 𝑆 − 𝐼 ≥ 0 𝐴 + 𝐹 + 𝑆 − 𝐼 ≥ 0 
BC1
u 𝑅𝐼 − 𝑅𝑒 − 𝑅𝑖 − 𝑆 ≥ 0 𝑅𝐼 − 𝑅𝑒 − 𝑅𝑖 ≥ 0 𝑅𝐼 − 𝑅𝑒 − 𝑅𝑖 − 𝑆 ≥ 0 
BC1
d 0 − 𝑟𝑒 − 𝑟𝑖 − 𝑆 ≥ 0 0 − 𝑟𝑒 − 𝑟𝑖 − 𝑆 ≥ 0 0 − 𝑟𝑒 − 𝑟𝑖 ≥ 0 
Step 2 max 𝑝𝐻 𝑅𝐼 + 𝐸𝐼 − 𝐼 max 𝑝𝐻 𝑅𝐼 + 𝐸𝐼 − 𝐼 max 𝑝𝐻 𝑅𝐼 + 𝐸𝐼 − 𝐼 
obj. max (𝑝𝐻𝑅 + 𝐸 − 1)
𝐴
1 − 𝜌0
 max  (𝑝𝐻𝑅 + 𝐸 − 1)
𝐴 + 𝑝𝐻 𝑆
1 − 𝜌0
 max  (𝑝𝐻𝑅 + 𝐸 − 1)
𝐴 + (1 − 𝑝𝐻 )𝑆
1 − 𝜌0
 
PCS 
𝐸𝐼 − 𝑆 + 𝑆 ≥ 0 𝐸𝐼 − 𝑆 + (1 − 𝑝𝐻 )𝑆 ≥ 0 𝐸𝐼 − 𝑆 + 𝑝𝐻 𝑆 ≥ 0 
𝐸
𝜌0
1 − 𝜌0
(𝐴 + 𝑆) − 𝑆 + 𝑆 ≥ 0 𝐸
𝐴 + 𝑝𝐻 𝑆
1 − 𝜌0
− 𝑆 + (1 − 𝑝𝐻 )𝑆 ≥ 0 𝐸
𝐴 + (1 − 𝑝𝐻 )𝑆
1 − 𝜌0
− 𝑆 + 𝑝𝐻 𝑆 ≥ 0 
Source: the authors
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4 Results 
 
In this section we compare and analyze the results of the optimization programs presented in 
Table 5. The most important result is that all real subsidies increase social welfare compared 
to the base case. 
 
Proposition 6 (Value added of real state subsidies) Real state subsidies unambiguously create 
value which is reflected in the increased project size and social utility. 
 
Proof In case of the basic two-player model the social utility (U) is 
 
 
𝑈 =
𝑝𝐻 𝑅 + 𝐸 − 1
1 − 𝜌0
𝐴 
(28) 
 
which comes from the combination of Equations (5) and (11) using that in optimum p=pH. In 
order to keep the model close to the reality we supposed the positivity of the investment size 
(𝐼 >  0) and the present value of state subsidy (𝑆 >  0), as well. It follows from these 
assumptions and from Equation (17) that in the optimum 1 − ρ0 − E > 0. Provided that 
Assumption 1 (Unconditional positive externalities) also holds, the comparison of Equation 
(5) to Equation (21) and Equation (28) to Equation (22) will lead us to the conclusion that in 
the optimum the size of the investment and also the social utility are unambiguously increased 
due to the state subsidy as it is summarized in Table 6: 
 
Table 6: Comparison of the results in the optimum 
 Without state subsidy 
(base case) 
With real state subsidy 
(our model) 
Size of the investment (I) 1
1 − 𝜌0
𝐴 
1
1 − 𝜌0 − 𝑬
𝐴 
Social utility (U) 𝑝𝐻 𝑅 + 𝐸 − 1
1 − 𝜌0
𝐴 
𝑝𝐻 𝑅 + 𝐸 − 1
1 − 𝜌0 − 𝑬
𝐴 
Source: the authors 
□ 
Therefore, it has been demonstrated that contrary to the common believes a properly designed 
subsidy system does not worsen, but improves the contractual incentives, so it effectively 
reduces moral hazard. The reduction in moral hazard can be due to the direct effect of 
additional capital provided by the state; but also to the indirect effect of the state capital to 
mobilize more private capital. Besides moral hazard, the state subsidy effectively resolves 
another market failure, as well: the externalities. Without state subsidy, these potential 
benefits are lost for the society. 
 
As we can see in Table 9 in Annex 2, in the optimum, the net present value of state subsidy 
(𝑆̅) is the same for all real subsidy forms, and its size depends only on the externalities (𝐸), 
on the pledgeable income (ρ0) and the initial asset of the entrepreneur (𝐴). 
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𝑆̅ =
𝐸
1 − 𝐸 − 𝜌0
𝐴 
(29) 
 
Hence, the same amount of public money induces the same project size and the same level of 
social welfare. Thus, these subsidy forms differ only in their phrasing and their internal 
structure, but their growth effects are the same. As the net present value of the state subsidy is 
the same, different forms of subsidies only influence the cash-flow of the private investor (F, 
Ri, ri). 
 
Interestingly, the cash-flow of the entrepreneur (Re) remains always the same, see Table 13 in 
Annex 2. Therefore, we can conclude that one important role of the private investor (besides 
providing the necessary capital) is to transform the cash-flow of the state subsidy into the 
shape what is optimal from the moral hazard aspect. 
 
For example in subsidy form 3 (ex post subsidy in case of failure or state guarantee) state only 
provides rescue in failure. However, according to Assumption 5 the entrepreneur cannot 
receive any transfer in failure (that would destroy his incentives); therefore it must be the 
private investor who receives this money directly. But, as this additional safety belt is 
provided by the state, the private investor is willing to provide more financing at the 
beginning in t=0 which makes the project size larger with all its beneficial effects. 
 
Another interesting case is subsidy form 5 (ex-ante subsidy refundable only in failure). It is 
clear that the entrepreneur is not able to pay anything in case of failure on his own as he has 
already invested all his capital into the project and has a limited liability. Therefore, in case of 
failure it is the private investor who has to stand in the gap and fulfill the commitment toward 
the state.10 
 
It is worth to examine the optimal level of private financing (𝐹), as well. If it is decreased 
relative to the base case, then it can be considered as the sign of some crowding out effects of 
the state subsidy. 
 
Proposition 7 (Crowding out effect) Nonrefundable state subsidies (1, 2, 3) do not crowd out 
private investors; moreover, they boost private financing by providing additional capital, 
hence reducing moral hazard. The same is true for conditional refundable subsidy form 6,  but 
form 5 may crowd out private financing depending on the parameter setting. Unconditional 
refundable subsidy (4) has no other effect but crowding out. 
 
Proof We can see in Table 10 in Annex 2 that the optimal private financing (𝐹) takes 
different values under different subsidy forms. In case of subsidy forms 1, 2, and 3 it is 
obvious for the first sight that state subsidy increases private financing as denominators are 
decreased and numerators are increased (forms 2, 3) or did not change (form 1).  
                                                 
10
 Apart from these two cases the return to the private investor in failure (ri) equals zero similarly to the basic 
two-player case. 
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In case of subsidy form 6 private financing is increased if and only if 
 
 𝜌0 −
𝒑𝑯
𝟏 − 𝒑𝑯
𝑬
1 − 𝜌0 − 𝑬
𝐴 >
𝜌0
1 − 𝜌0
𝐴 
(30) 
 
Given that both denominators are positive, it follows that Inequality (30) is equivalent to 
𝜌0 > 𝑝𝐻 . This always holds since Inequality (13) implies (𝑝𝐻 − 𝑝𝐿 )𝑅 > 𝐵. 
 
In case of subsidy form 5 we similarly obtain that there is no crowding out effect if and only if 
𝜌0 > 1 − 𝑝𝐻. This inequality holds if 𝑝𝐻 > 0.5 or 𝑝𝐻 𝑅 > 2 or 𝐵 > 𝑝𝐻 − 𝑝𝐿, but can befalse 
for suitable parameter settings, for example 𝐸 = 0.1, 𝑅 = 2.6, 𝑝𝐻 = 0.4, 𝑝𝐿 = 0.25, and 
𝐵 = 0.2.  
 
As far as unconditional refundable subsidy is concerned, its crowding out effect was 
extensively discussed in Proposition 4. □ 
 
As we saw, it is only form 5 which may have a crowding out effect in the sense that the initial 
private investment can be lower than in the base case. This is due to the fact that form 5 is the 
only one where private investor has to contribute not only at the beginning of the project but 
also at the end in case of failure. A simple calculation shows that if we added also the 
expected value of these expenses to the initial investment, then there would be no crowding 
out effect for this form either. 
 
Proposition 8 (Entrepreneur gets all surpluses) In the three-player moral hazard model the 
total social surplus is given to the entrepreneur which motivates him to exert maximum effort. 
 
Proof The entrepreneur invests 𝐴 at 𝑡 = 0 and gets back 𝑅𝑒 in case of success and nothing in 
case of failure. His return in success (𝑅𝑒) is the same under each real subsidy form; see Table 
13 in Annex 2. His net surplus (𝑁𝑃𝑉𝑒) can be expressed as 
 
𝑁𝑃𝑉𝑒 = 𝑝𝐻 𝑅𝑒 − 𝐴 = 𝑝𝐻
𝑝𝐻 𝑅 − 𝜌0
𝑝𝐻 (1 − 𝜌0 − 𝑬)
𝐴 − 𝐴 =
𝑝𝐻 𝑅 + 𝐸 − 1
(1 − 𝜌0 − 𝑬)
 
 
which is just the total social utility given in Table 14 in Annex 2. □ 
 
We remind that in the base case model only the private surplus was given to the entrepreneur, 
whilst the positive external effects were enjoyed by the broader society for free. In our three 
player model the positive external effects are increased significantly due to the state subsidy 
(see Proposition 6); moreover, the society pays out all of these externalities to the 
entrepreneur. Hence, in the end of the story externalities became internalized. 
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5 Conclusions 
 
In order to model the relationship between state subsidy and moral hazard in corporate 
financing we built on the seminal paper of Holmström and Tirole (1997) which is considered 
as one of the best representations of the topic in case of private parties (entrepreneur and 
private investor). We kept all the assumptions of this basic model (sizeable project with 
constant rate of return, relevance of moral hazard, risk neutrality of both private players, 
limited liability of the entrepreneur, unlimited liability of the investor, no reward for the 
entrepreneur in failure), but generalized it by introducing state as a third player. As a strict 
budget constraint, state could only finance the subsidies from the positive externalities 
realized by the end of the project. 
 
It can be concluded from our investigation that negative experiences with subsidized projects 
cannot be explained by the mere fact of state subsidy. In the framework of our model moral 
hazard is decreased, the size of the project is increased, and social welfare is definitely 
improved by the state intervention; and it is independent from the form of the state subsidy 
(provided that it is considered as a real subsidy). 
 
Moreover, in case of nonrefundable subsidies (forms 1, 2, and 3) state does not crowd out 
private investors; but on the contrary, by providing additional capital it boosts private 
financing. Refundable subsidies show a mixed picture. Non-subsidized loans to be refunded 
unconditionally in any case (both in success and failure) have no growth effects at all, and 
state subsidy crowds out private investments completelyhence this is definitely not an 
appropriate tool to fight credit rationing and moral hazard. Ex-ante subsidies refundable only 
in success (form 6) has no crowding out effect at all, whereas ex-ante subsidies refundable 
only in failure (form 5) may or may not crowd out depending on the parameters. 
 
It is also remarkable that in the optimum it is the entrepreneur who gets all the private and 
social surplus of the project, which constitutes a strong motivation for him to exert high 
efforts for the success of the project. Hence, as a result of state intervention externalities 
become internalized by the private parties; which contributes to the efficiency at macro level, 
as well. 
 
Of course, in the real world it is not guaranteed that state makes optimal contracts. For 
example it may subsidize projects without any positive social effect, and/or may serve the 
interest of particular lobbies, and/or incentives are not properly set because of lack of 
information, and/or administration is too costly etc. However, as we have proven, the moral 
hazard experienced in subsidized projects is not due to the state subsidy per se. Further 
research can clarify which aspects are responsible for these unfavorable phenomena. 
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Annex 1: Empirical literature 
 
Table 7: Summary of empirical literature on state subsidies 
 Authors Year 
of 
publ. 
Database Moral hazard / 
adverse selection 
Other effects of state 
subsidy 
Overall 
effect 
Crowding 
out 
1 Biagi, 
Martini 
2015 Italy                         
2000-2009 
effects differ across regions 
within the same country 
positive  
2 Bondonio, 
Greenbaum 
2010 Italy                  
2000-2003 
 higher leverage  positive  
3 Borisova et 
al.  
2015 43 countries           
1991-2010 
moral hazard 
(higher risk, less 
efficiency) 
positive in crisis and in case 
of high-bankruptcy risk firms 
positive only 
in crisis 
 
4 Breska 
(page 209) 
2010 East 
Germany 
1996-2007 
 enhanced investment positive  
5 Bronzini, 
Piselli 
2016 Italy                       
2005-2011 
moral hazard in 
case of larger 
firms 
 positive in 
case of 
SMEs  
 
6 Cull et al. 2015 China                      
2000-2002 
 firms easier to overcome 
market failures with 
governmental aid 
positive  
7 Czarnitzki, 
Lopes-Bento 
2013 Flanders 
(Belgium) 
2002-2008 
 repeated support does not 
decrease efficiency 
positive no 
8 Garcia, 
Mohn 
2010 Austria                              
1998-2000 
boosted R&D spending positive  
9 Girma, 
Görg, Strobl 
2007 Ireland                    
1992-1998 
additional financing, improves 
productivity more for capital 
constrained firms 
positive  
10 González, 
Pazó 
2008 Spain                      
1990-1999 
no adverse 
selection  
more innovation positive no 
11 Hong et al. 2015 China                     
1995-2008 
moral hazard in 
case of larger 
high-tech firms 
 positive no 
12 Huergo, 
Moreno 
2014 Spain                      
2002-2005 
more patents and product 
innovations 
positive  
13 Huergo, 
Trenado, 
Ubierna 
2015 Spain                        
2002-2005 
adverse selection 
(larger firms 
overrrepresented) 
more R&D, persistence in 
R&D spending 
positive in 
case of 
SMEs  
 
14 Kállay 2014 Hungary               
2004-2011 
moral hazard  negative  
  
23 
 
15 Luukkonen, 
Deschryvere, 
Bertoni 
2013 7 EU 
countries 
1994-2004 
no moral hazard 
in case of gov. 
venture funds 
state owned venture fund adds 
value in a different way than 
privately owned ones 
positive 
(similar to 
private VC) 
 
16 Meuleman, 
Maeseneire 
2012 Belgium                
1995-2004 
reduced adverse 
selection 
better long term financing 
possibilities 
positive  
17 Monqué 2012 EU 
countries, 
review of 
other studies 
 easing shortage of capital, low 
efficiency in larger firms 
positive only 
in case of 
SMEs 
 
18 Simachev, 
Kuzyk, 
Feygina 
2015 Russia                        
2012 
adverse selection, 
moral hazard 
grant for innovation only 
boosts export 
not 
significant 
yes 
19 Widerstedt, 
Månsson 
2015 Sweden                 
2004-2007 
adverse selection faster growth but no efficiency 
improvement 
low or no 
added value 
yes 
20 Zheng, Zhu 2013 China                      
1999-2005 
moral hazard in 
case of firms with 
political support  
debt of firms with strong 
political connections less 
linked to profitability 
unclear  
Source: the authors 
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Annex 2: Characteristics of the optimum 
 
 
Table 8: Investment (I) 
 
Without state subsidy: 
𝐼 =
1
1 − 𝑝𝐻 (𝑅 −
𝐵
∆𝑝)
𝐴 =
1
1 − 𝜌0
𝐴 
 
 
With state subsidy: 
 
 1 
1
1 − 𝜌0 − 𝑬
𝐴 
 
2 
1
1 − 𝜌0 − 𝑬
𝐴 
 3 
1
1 − 𝜌0 − 𝑬
𝐴 
 4 
1
1 − 𝜌0
𝐴 
 
5 
1
1 − 𝜌0 − 𝑬
𝐴 
6 
1
1 − 𝜌0 − 𝑬
𝐴 
Source: the authors 
 
 
Table 9: Net present value of state subsidy (𝑆̅) 
 
Without state subsidy: 
𝑆̅ = 0 
 
 
 
With state subsidy: 
 
 1 
𝑬
(𝟏 − 𝝆𝟎 − 𝑬)
𝑨 
 
 2 
𝑬
(𝟏 − 𝝆𝟎 − 𝑬)
𝑨 
 
3 
𝑬
(𝟏 − 𝝆𝟎 − 𝑬)
𝑨 
 
 4 
𝑆̅ = 0 
 
 5 
𝑬
(𝟏 − 𝝆𝟎 − 𝑬)
𝑨 
 
 6 
𝑬
(𝟏 − 𝝆𝟎 − 𝑬)
𝑨 
 
Source: the authors 
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Table 10: Private financing (F) 
 
Without state subsidy:  
𝐹 =
𝜌0
1 − 𝜌0
𝐴 
 
 
 
With state subsidy: 
 
 1 
𝜌0
1 − 𝜌0 − 𝑬
𝐴 
 2 
𝜌0 + 𝑬
1 − 𝜌0 − 𝑬
𝐴 
 3 
𝜌0 + 𝑬
1 − 𝜌0 − 𝑬
𝐴 
 
 4 
𝜌0
1 − 𝜌0
𝐴 
 5 
𝜌0 −
𝟏 − 𝒑𝑯
𝒑𝑯
𝑬
1 − 𝜌0 − 𝑬
𝐴 
 6 
𝜌0 −
𝒑𝑯
𝟏 − 𝒑𝑯
𝑬
1 − 𝜌0 − 𝑬
𝐴 
Source: the authors 
 
 
Table 11: Return to the private investor in case of success (Ri) 
 
Without state subsidy: 
𝑅𝑖 =
𝜌0
𝑝𝐻 (1 − 𝜌0 )
𝐴 
 
 
With state subsidy: 
 
 1 
𝜌0
𝑝𝐻 (1 − 𝜌0 − 𝑬)
𝐴 
 2 
𝜌0 + 𝑬
𝑝𝐻 (1 − 𝜌0 − 𝑬)
𝐴 
 3 
𝜌0
𝑝𝐻 (1 − 𝜌0 − 𝑬)
𝐴 
 
 4 
𝑅𝑖 =
𝜌0
𝑝𝐻 (1 − 𝜌0 )
𝐴 
 
 5 
𝜌0
𝑝𝐻 (1 − 𝜌0 − 𝑬)
𝐴 
 6 
𝜌0 −
𝒑𝑯
𝟏 − 𝒑𝑯
𝑬
𝑝𝐻 (1 − 𝜌0 − 𝑬)
𝐴 
Source: the authors 
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Table 12: Return to the private investor in case of failure (ri) 
 
Without state subsidy: 
𝑟𝑖 = 0 
 
 
 
With state subsidy: 
 
 1 
0 
 2 
0 
 3 
𝑬
(𝟏 − 𝒑𝑯)(𝟏 − 𝝆𝟎 − 𝑬)
𝑨 
 
 4 
0 
 
 5 
−
𝑬
𝒑𝑯(𝟏 − 𝝆𝟎 − 𝑬)
𝑨 
 
 6 
0 
 
Source: the authors 
 
 
 
Table 13: Return to the entrepreneur (Re): 
 
Without state subsidy: 
𝑅𝑏 =
𝑝𝐻𝑅 − 𝜌0
𝑝𝐻 (1 − 𝜌0 )
𝐴 
 
 
With state subsidy: 
 
 1 
𝑝𝐻 𝑅 − 𝜌0
𝑝𝐻 (1 − 𝜌0 − 𝑬)
𝐴 
 2 
𝑝𝐻 𝑅 − 𝜌0
𝑝𝐻 (1 − 𝜌0 − 𝑬)
𝐴 
3 
𝑝𝐻 𝑅 − 𝜌0
𝑝𝐻 (1 − 𝜌0 − 𝑬)
𝐴 
 
4 
𝑝𝐻 𝑅 − 𝜌0
𝑝𝐻 (1 − 𝜌0 )
𝐴 
 
5 
𝑝𝐻 𝑅 − 𝜌0
𝑝𝐻 (1 − 𝜌0 − 𝑬)
𝐴 
 6 
𝑝𝐻 𝑅 − 𝜌0
𝑝𝐻 (1 − 𝜌0 − 𝑬)
𝐴 
Source: the authors 
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Table 14: Social utility (U): 
 
Without state subsidy: 
𝑈 =
𝑝𝐻 𝑅 + 𝐸 − 1
1 − 𝜌0
𝐴 
 
 
With state subsidy: 
 
1 
𝑝𝐻 𝑅 + 𝐸 − 1
1 − 𝜌0 − 𝑬
𝐴 
 2 
𝑝𝐻 𝑅 + 𝐸 − 1
1 − 𝜌0 − 𝑬
𝐴 
 3 
𝑝𝐻 𝑅 + 𝐸 − 1
1 − 𝜌0 − 𝑬
𝐴 
 
4 
𝑝𝐻 𝑅 + 𝐸 − 1
1 − 𝜌0
𝐴 
 5 
𝑝𝐻 𝑅 + 𝐸 − 1
1 − 𝜌0 − 𝑬
𝐴 
6 
𝑝𝐻 𝑅 + 𝐸 − 1
1 − 𝜌0 − 𝑬
𝐴 
 
Source: the authors 
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